"കൊച്ചിയിലെ യുദ്ധം (1504)" എന്ന താളിന്റെ പതിപ്പുകൾ തമ്മിലുള്ള വ്യത്യാസം

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വരി 63:
<!--Sentiment among the Cochinese population was largely against the Portuguese. Cochin was not self-sufficient in food, and the people had suffered much from the general disruption of trade along the Malabar coast. Moreover, Cochin had a significant Muslim population – both expatriate [[Arab]]s and local [[Muslim Mappila|Mappila]]s – and the Portuguese had made no secret of their hostility towards them. Yet these were usually the very traders upon whom the city's subsistence depended. The Cochinese population did not, could not, see the point of the current state of affairs.-->എന്നാൽ പൊതുജനങ്ങളിൽ ഭൂരിപക്ഷം പേരും പോർട്ടുഗീസുകാർക്കെതിരായിരുന്നു. ഭക്ഷണകാര്യത്തിൽ പോലും കൊച്ചി അന്ന് സ്വയംപര്യാപ്തമായിരുന്നില്ല, മലബാർ ദേശത്തെ വ്യാപാരം തടസ്സപ്പെട്ടതുമൂലം ജനങ്ങൾക്ക് കഷ്ടപ്പാടുകൾ കൂടുതലായി അനുഭവപ്പെട്ടു. കൂടാതെ അന്ന് കൊച്ചിയിൽ പ്രവാസി അറബികളും പ്രാദേശിക മാപ്പിളകളും കൂടുതലായിട്ടുണ്ടായിരുന്നു. ഇവരോടൊന്നും തന്നെ പോർച്ചുഗീസുകാർ അവരുടെ എതിർപ്പിന്റെ രഹസ്യം വെളിപ്പെടുത്തിയില്ല. എന്നാൽ പ്രശ്നങ്ങളൊക്കെയും അനുഭവപ്പെട്ടത് നഗരത്തിൽ ഉപജീവനമാർഗ്ഗം ആശ്രയിച്ചിരുന്ന വ്യാപാരികളെയായിരുന്നു. കൊച്ചിയിലെ സാധാരണ ജനതയെ നാടിൽ വന്നുകൊണ്ടിരിക്കുന്ന സ്ഥിതിവിശേഷങ്ങൾ ബാധിച്ചിട്ടേ ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നില്ല.
 
<!-- Sensing the resentment, Trimumpara Raja had the Portuguese factor [[Diogo Fernandes Correia]] and his assistants, [[Lourenço Moreno]] and [[Álvaro Vaz]], stay at his own palace, and ensured they were always escorted by loyal guards when walking around the city's markets. But the Zamorin's influence over the [[Kerala]] hinterlands had dried up much of Cochin's pepper supply. The Portuguese [[Factor (agent)|factors]] were disappointed at the spare findings on Cochin's spice markets, and the Trimumpara Raja was painfully aware of their increasing interest in other more promising cities, notably [[Quilon]]. If the Portuguese abandoned Cochin, the Trimumpara would have nothing to show for his pains. [[File:16th Century Malabarese Nayar.png|thumb|250px|16th century Portuguese depiction of a Malabarese Nair warrior]]-->
പോർച്ചുഗീസ് ഫാക്ടറി കാര്യസ്ഥൻ ഡയോഗോ ഫെർണാണ്ടസ് കോറിയയും അദ്ദേഹത്തിൻറെ സഹായികളായ ലോറൻസ്കോ മോറെനോയും അൽവാറോ വാസും അന്ന് തൃമുമ്പാറ ഭരണാധികാരിയോടൊപ്പം ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നു, കൊട്ടാരത്തിൽ താമസിച്ച്, അവർ എപ്പോഴും നഗരത്തിന്റെ ചുറ്റുപാടുകളിൽ നടക്കുമ്പോൾ വിശ്വസ്തരായ ഗാർഡുകൾ അവരോടൊപ്പം യാത്രാസൗകര്യങ്ങളുണ്ടാക്കി കൂടെയുണ്ടായിരുന്നു. എന്നാൽ തുറമുഖങ്ങളിലൂടെയുടെ സാമൂതിരിയുടെ സ്വാധീനവും മറ്റും കൊച്ചിയിലെ കുരുമുളക് വിതരണം കൂടുതൽ വഷളാക്കിയിരുന്നു. കുടെ, കൊച്ചിയുടെ സുഗന്ധവ്യഞ്ജന വിപണികളെക്കുറിച്ചുള്ള കണ്ടെത്തലുകളും പോർട്ടുഗീസ് ഘടകങ്ങളെ നിരാശരാക്കി. കൊല്ലം പോലുള്ള മറ്റ് പ്രധാന നഗരങ്ങളിലേക്കുള്ള പോർച്ചുഗീസുകാരുടെ വർദ്ധിച്ചുവരുന്ന താല്പര്യം തൃമുമ്പാറ രാജവിന് അറിയാമായിരുന്നു. പോർട്ടുഗീസുകാർ കൊച്ചി നിരോധിച്ചിരുന്നില്ലെങ്കിൽ തൃമുമ്പാറ രാജയ്ക്ക് ബുദ്ധിമുട്ടാൻനൊന്നും തന്നെ ഉണ്ടായിരുന്നില്ല.
 
<!--The Trimumpara's advisors argued against the Portuguese alliance, and urged him to pursue a reconciliation with the Zamorin. They warned him that the continued loyalty of the Cochinese [[Nair]]s could not be taken for granted in the event of a war. Nonetheless, the Trimumpara Raja refused to abandon the Portuguese.-->
പോർച്ചുഗീസ് സഖ്യത്തെ എതിരിടുവാൻ തൃമുമ്പാറയുടെ ഉപദേശകർ വാദിച്ചു നോക്കിയിരുന്നു. സാമൂതിരിയോട് അനുരഞ്ജനത്തിലേർപ്പെടുവാനും അതോടൊപ്പം അവർ അദ്ദേഹത്തെ പ്രേരിപ്പിച്ചു. ഒരു യുദ്ധസമയത്ത് കൊച്ചിയിലെ [[നായന്മാർ|നായന്മാരുടെ]] വിശ്വസ്തത എടുക്കാൻ കഴിയില്ലെന്ന് അവർ അദ്ദേഹത്തോട് ആവശ്യപ്പെട്ടു. ഇങ്ങനെയൊക്കെയാണെങ്കിലും, പോർച്ചുഗീസുകാരെ ഉപേക്ഷിക്കാൻ തൃമുമ്പാറ രാജ വിസമ്മതിച്ചു.
 
In March, 1503, as soon as the Portuguese fleet ([[4th Portuguese India Armada (Gama, 1502)|4th Armada]]) had set sail back to Lisbon, the Zamorin decided to intimidate his enemy into compliance. The Portuguese had left a small [[4th Portuguese India Armada (Gama, 1502)#The Coastal Patrol|coastal patrol]] behind, to help defend Cochin. But the patrol's commander, [[Vicente Sodré]] dismissed the rumors of the Zamorin's military preparations and decided to take his patrol to cruise the mouth of the [[Red Sea]]. They did not return until the end of the summer.
 
In April, the Zamorin led a large Calicut army of some 50,000 troops against Cochin. Along the way, he was to be joined by allied Malabari lords, notably the rulers of Edapalli. The Trimumpara's son Narayan rushed with a force of 5,500 Cochinese troops to block the passage of the Calicut army over a [[Ford (crossing)|ford]] near [[Edapalli]] (''Repelim''). Narayan valiantly repelled two Calicut assaults, but eventually the Zamorin's agents, by bribery and subterfuge, managed to detach many of the Cochinese Nairs from the frontline. In the next assault, Narayan was overwhelmed and killed, along with his remaining forces.
 
Narayan's brave stand gave his father and his Portuguese guests enough time to flee Cochin across the water to [[Vypin]] island (''Vaipi'') with a small core of loyal guards. The Zamorin seized Cochin city and demanded Trimumpara hand over the Portuguese agents, but the king refused. Vypin's natural defenses and the worsening weather prevented the launching of an assault against the island. The frustrated Zamorin limited himself to burning the city of Cochin and vowed to return after the weather improved.
 
[Before burning down Cochin, the Zamorin of Calicut removed an ancient sacred stone, upon which the old [[Chera Dynasty|Chera Kings of Malabar]] were traditionally ceremonially esconsed as lords of the sea and overlords of all the Malabari states. The sacred stone had originally been housed at the ancient Malabari capital of [[Cranganore]], but had since been moved to Cochin. The Zamorin now moved it once more, to Edapalli.<ref>Whiteway (1899: p. 95, 251)</ref>]
 
The main Calicut army returned that same August, and once again Trimumpara Raja and the Portuguese agents were holed up in Vypin. The Zamorin and his Malabari allies were in the process of preparing assault boats against the island, when they spotted six armed Portuguese ships under [[Francisco de Albuquerque]] – the vanguard of the arriving [[5th Portuguese India Armada (Albuquerque, 1503)|5th Armada]] – racing towards Cochin. The allied Malabari armies began to melt away immediately. The Zamorin reluctantly dismantled the siege and returned to Calicut.
 
=== Preparations ===
 
Cochin had been saved in the nick of time, but the Zamorin's armies were sure to return next Spring, as soon as the 5th Armada left. So the Portuguese immediately set about making preparations for Cochin's defense in the fleet's absence.
 
In the first order of business, a squadron of Portuguese ships did a tour of the [[Vembanad]] lagoon, punishing the local princelets who had given their support to the Zamorin's siege. Notable in this campaign was the Portuguese brutal sack of [[Edapalli]], razing the city, with great bloodshed. Smaller towns and villages either met a similar fate, or quickly switched their allegiance over to Cochin. In this manner, the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin was forcibly imposed by Portuguese arms as the overlord of the Vembanad lagoon.<ref>According to Dames (1918), by the complicated rules of succession, Trimumpara Raja should have actually moved to Edapalli, the formal seat of the lord of the lagoon, and assigned the government of Cochin city to his successor. But the Portuguese insisted he remain in Cochin himself. As a result, this date (1503) usually marks the beginning of the foundation of [[Kingdom of Cochin]] proper. On the other hand, some sources note that the Trimumpara Raja abdicated around this time or soon after the battle, and his successor (apparently a nephew), also named Unni Goda Varda (''Candagora''), became the king of Cochin. If true, this may not necessarily be an abdication as normally understood, but simply a faithful following of the succession rules – the old Trimumpara may have indeed 'moved' to Edapalli (i.e. taken up that title formally, and officially assigned Cochin to his successor, the new Trimumpara). It was the successor, not the original (and still-living) Trimumpara, that was crowned by [[Francisco de Almeida]] in late 1505 with a golden crown as "King of Cochin".</ref>
 
In the meantime, the Portuguese commanders persuaded Trimumpara Raja to allow them to erect a fortress on the edge of the Cochinese peninsula (an area now known as [[Fort Kochi]]), just a little to the west of the old city of Cochin proper (around what is now [[Mattancherry]]). Fort Manuel de Cochim, as it was named, was the first Portuguese fort in Asia. Built from local coconut palm timber supplied by the Trimumpara himself, the fort was completed in a couple of months.
 
As soon at it was finished, the Portuguese fleet commander [[Afonso de Albuquerque]], against all odds, suddenly agreed to a peace treaty with the Zamorin of Calicut. It was probably a cynical move on both sides – no one really expected the peace to hold, but it bought them a little time. For a few weeks, the Portuguese could finish their defenses, the Zamorin could prepare his forces, without being molested by the other. But the peace was soon broken again in a skirmish over the delivery of a spice shipment in Cranganore.<ref>Logan (1887, p.&nbsp;310)</ref>
 
[[File:Duarte Pacheco Pereira.jpg|thumb|200px|right|[[Duarte Pacheco Pereira]], first commander of Fort Manuel of Cochin]] In late January, 1504, Albuquerque's [[5th Portuguese India Armada (Albuquerque, 1503)|5th Armada]] finally departed Cochin. They left behind a small garrison of around 150 armed Portuguese troops (some say only 130 or less <ref>The discrepancy in numbers may have to do with the fact that Pacheco was also saddled with all the sick and injured Portuguese crew members who could not make the return journey. While the total may be 150, able-bodied men might be closer to the lower number. (Day, 1863: p.&nbsp;92)</ref>) in Fort Manuel of Cochin, under the command of the knight [[Duarte Pacheco Pereira]]. Pacheco was also given three ships – one [[carrack]] (the nau ''Concepção'' under Diogo Pereira) and two [[caravels]] (the ''Garrida'' of [[Pêro Rafael]], and another of unknown name under [[Diogo Pires]] (or Peres)).
 
[Note: It is possible that this 'Diogo Pereira' is none other than [[Diogo Fernandes Pereira]] the lost captain of the third squadron of the [[5th Portuguese India Armada (Albuquerque, 1503)|5th Armada]], who had discovered [[Socotra]] and wintered there, and set on a solo crossed of the Indian Ocean around this time. If so, then the nau ''Concepção'' might be his ship.]<ref>Alas lists of the [[5th Portuguese India Armada (Albuquerque, 1503)|5th Armada]] do not give the name of Diogo Fernandes Pereira's original ship. Albuquerque's ''Commentaries'' (p.&nbsp;16) insist he left Duarte Pacheco the nau ''Concepção'' (Pacheco's own ship, the ''Espírito Santo'', evidently returned with Albuquerque). However, it is possible that Albuquerque left merely two caravels and simply gave Duarte Pacheco the ''authority'' to exert command over whatever naus of the lost Third Squadron showed up in India; and Diogo Fernandes Pereira just arrived from Socotra shortly after with the ''Concepção''. But this is purely speculative. 'Diogo Pereira' could be someone else altogether.</ref>
 
Intelligence networks in south India were such that both the Zamorin and the Trimumpara knew each other's every movement (the element of surprise was never really an exploitable tactic on the Malabar coast). And, sure enough, news soon arrived of the assembly of a large invasion army in Calicut. Unlike the previous one, this army was better equipped. The Zamorin had received a large contingent of firearms ([[arquebus]]es and/or [[musket]]s) from the [[Ottoman Empire|Turks]]. Two [[Republic of Venice|Venetian]] agents that had secretly come to India with the [[4th Portuguese India Armada (Gama, 1502)|4th Armada]] had been busy helping Calicut forge better artillery. At least five European large cannons were ready, as well as a couple hundred smaller boat guns. Notices had been sent to the Zamorin's allies – the lords (''caimals'') of [[Edapalli]], [[Cranganore]], [[Kottakkal]], [[Kingdom of Tanur]] (Vettath raja of Vettattnad), [[Beypore]], [[Chaliyam]], [[Pariyapuram]] etc. – to prepare their auxiliary forces.<ref>The auxiliaries of the Zamorin of Calicut named by [[João de Barros]] (Vol. 2, p.&nbsp;140) include the kings and lords of ''Tanore'' ([[Kingdom of Tanur]] or Vettattnad), ''Bespur'' ([[Beypore]]) ''Cucurão'' ("by the [[Western Ghats]]", [[Kottakal]]?), ''Cotugão'' ("between Cannanore and Calicut"), ''Curim'' ("between Ponnani and Cranganore"), ''Repelim'' ([[Edapalli]]), ''Crangalor'' ([[Cranganore]]), ''Chaliao'' ([[Chaliyam]]), ''Parapuram'' ([[Pariyapuram]]?), ''Banala Carij'' (?), and several other large regional lords and 'near-kings'.</ref>
 
News of the size and arms of the Zamorin's alerted Cochin. Cochin had lost a battle during the previous year's siege. Although, in his new position as lord of the [[Vembanad]] backwaters, the Trimumpara Raja could, notionally, call on 30,000 troops from around the lagoon, at most 8,000 might respond to his call, the remainder being "actively or passively hostile." <ref>Bell (1917: 84); Whiteway (1899: p.&nbsp;97). According to [[João de Barros]] (Dec. I, Lib 7, c.7, vol. 2, p.&nbsp;139) the nominal vassals of Cochin included the lords of ''Paliporte'' ([[Pallippuram, Ernakulam|Pallipuram]]), ''Balurt'' ([[Palluruthy]]?), ''Bagadarij'' (?), ''Porca'' ([[Purakkad]]),''Mangate'' ([[Alengad]]), ''Cambalão'' ([[Kumbalam, Ernakulam|Kumbalam]]), ''Cherij'' ([[Cherai]]) and ''Vaipij'' ([[Vypin]]). All but Vypin seem to have abandoned him.</ref>
 
Rumors soon spread through Cochin that the Portuguese garrison had no intention to stay, that ships were being prepared to evacuate the Portuguese to Cannanore or Quilon the moment the Zamorin's army arrived, and leave the Cochinese to bear the brunt of the assault. The population of Cochin began to evacuate the city. Trimumpara Raja himself began to waver, his advisors urging him to seek out a reconciliation with the Zamorin before it was too late.
 
Duarte Pacheco's first order of business was to stiffen Trimumpara Raja's resolve, persuading him that the Portuguese were there to stay. Remembering how the Portuguese coastal patrol of [[Vicente Sodré]] had [[5th Portuguese India Armada (Albuquerque, 1503)|abandoned them during last year's siege]], the Trimumpara had ample reason to doubt Pacheco's word. But he also knew his fate was fatally tied to the Portuguese. Shaking off his misgivings, he placed the defense of the city in their hands. Trimumpara issued edicts forbidding anybody to leave Cochin on the penalty of death, and ordering his own officials and soldiers to treat an order from Duarte Pacheco as if it were his own.
 
Of particular concern was the [[Muslim Mappila|Muslim merchant]] community in Cochin. The Portuguese had made no secret of their hostility and regarded them suspiciously as a '[[fifth column]]' for the Zamorin. But Cochin was dependent upon their trade for their food supply and should the siege be prolonged, the fate of the city would be in their hands. Duarte Pacheco went out of his way to secure their cooperation. He addressed an assembly the leading Muslim merchants of Cochin, promising that no harm would come to them. He co-opted a few of their leaders (notably, a certain Muhammad Marakkar) and, just in case, held some leading Muslim families hostage, shipping them over the outlet under guard to [[Vypin]] island for the duration of the hostilities.<ref>Whiteway (1899: 98)</ref> Large stores of foodstuffs ([[rice]], [[sugar]], etc.) were also stockpiled in Vypin in case the Zamorin's agents set fire to the city or it had to be evacuated.<ref>Correia (p.&nbsp;427)</ref>
 
In prelude, Duarte Pacheco launched a few minor raids on some small settlements around [[Edapalli]], which sided with the Zamorin. Their strategic value was minor – it was more a show of force and bravado, to inculcate confidence in the Cochin population that the Portuguese were itching for a fight. (However, it seems that these raids may have inadvertently damaged one of the two Portuguese caravels, making it unavailable for the upcoming confrontation).
 
== Pass of Cambalão ==
 
From intelligence networks, Duarte Pacheco Pereira received the details of the Zamorin's armed forces and, more importantly, their movements. The Zamorin himself was leading a 57,000 strong army of Calicut (some cite 84,000, which may or may not include auxiliaries;<ref>Matthew (1997)</ref> although certainly most of these were very lightly armed, at best.<ref>Whiteway (1899: p.&nbsp;98)</ref>). The Zamorin's army was bringing the five European large guns, cast by the two Venetian engineers, and nearly 300 smaller Indian guns. The army was assembled near [[Cranganore]], and were to march south along the east bank of the [[Vembanad]] lagoon, and cross the [[Ford (crossing)|ford]]ing passage by [[Kumbalam, Ernakulam|Kumbalam]] (''Cambalão''). The ford was said to be a mere 100 m wide, waist-deep, and passable at all tides, so the vast Calicut army would not need to go through the complicated, disorderly process of loading and unloading [[ferry]]-boats.
 
The Calicut fleet was composed of 160 vessels – about 76 of which were ''paraus''<ref>Osório (p.&nbsp;278)</ref> (a sail-and-oar-powered Malabari warship, often compared by European writers to a [[fusta]] or [[galiot]] <ref>Matthew (1997: p.&nbsp;23)</ref>). Each ''parau'' was armed with two bombards, five muskets and 25 archers.<ref>Saraiva (1849: p.&nbsp;132); Matthew (1997: p.&nbsp;13)</ref> The remaining boats were smaller, some 54 ''catures'' (a smaller version of the parau) and 30 ''tones'' ([[canoe]]s), each mounted with a cannon, and 16 soldiers.,<ref>Osório (p.&nbsp;278) estimates that the Calicut fleet carried 12,000 men. That is, separately from the 57,000 infantry. Faria e Sousa argues the fleet carried only 4,000.</ref> The fleet was under the command of the Zamorin's nephew (and heir of Calicut), Naubea Daring (''Naubeadarim''), with the lord (''caimal'') Elcanol of Edapalli as second-in-command. The fleet was to slip into the Vembanad lagoon via the outlet near [[Cranganore]] and then sail down the lagoon, accompanying and protecting the infantry.
 
Being fully informed of the Zamorin's plans, Duarte Pacheco Pereira determined that the Portuguese-Cochinese forces needed to block the passage of the army at Kumbalam ford (''Passo de Cambalão''). That meant distributing his forces carefully. He placed the factor [[Diogo Fernandes Correia]] and his two assistants, [[Lourenço Moreno]] and [[Álvaro Vaz]], with 39 men at [[Fort Manuel]]. The large [[Nau (ship)|''nau'']] ''Concepção'' was loaded with 25 men, artillery and five expert gunners, and placed under the command of Diogo Pereira (possibly [[Diogo Fernandes Pereira]]?) and instructed to remain close to the Fort and defend [[Cochin]] city (it would simultaneously guard the Vembanad outlet and prevent Calicut ships from slipping through there).
 
Duarte Pacheco placed 26 men in one of the caravels under the command of [[Pêro Rafael]]. The other caravel still under repair, Pacheco commandeered two Malabarese ''bateis'' (comparable to [[pinnace (ship's boat)|pinnace]]s), placing one (with 23 men) under [[Diogo Pires]], and the other (with 22 men) under himself.<ref>Faria e Sousa, p.&nbsp;61</ref> Each ''batel'' was armed with four [[swivel guns]]. These three vessels would try to hold Kumbalam ford.
 
Cochinese workers had produced a collection of tower shields (''[[Pavise|paveses]]''), thick wooden planks, two fingers thick, which were mounted all along the sides of the caravel and bateis as makeshift [[crenellation]]s to protect the crew from missile fire. Rope nets were hung across the masts and sacks filled with cotton were placed throughout the ship's deck, and hung all along the sides, to protect the ships from cannonballs.<ref>Osório (p. 278) claims the Calicut ''paraus'', at the urging of the Venetian agents, had also been reinforced with cotton sacks.</ref> Boatloads of good hard stone had been shipped down from [[Anjediva]] island to be carved by Cochinese workers into cannonballs for the Portuguese guns.<ref>Correia (p. 427)</ref> Cochinese workers had also been quietly producing a large number of 3.5-metre-tall (12 ft) poles, sharpened at one end, hardened by fire on the other, with pre-cut grooves to allow them to be snapped tight with crosspoles.<ref>Whiteway (1899: 93); Correia (p.&nbsp;427)</ref>
 
The bulk of his army having deserted, Trimumpara Raja of Cochin was left with less than 5,000 troops. He assigned around 500 [[Nair]]s to join Duarte Pacheco's little fleet at Kumbalam pass, retaining the remainder to protect the city.
 
Navigating carefully through the thin brackish narrows and straits of Vembanad lake, Duarte Pacheco's three ships (and accompanying Cochinese boats) arrived at the Kumbalam ford, a mere 100 m of shallow water. Pacheco ordered the long sharpened poles drilled deep mid-channel and across the length of the ford, a makeshift [[stockade]] to block the passage of the infantry. He subsequently ordered the ships tied to each other, and to the banks (with iron cords, so that they could not be easily cut and set adrift). The ships were set with the broadsides facing the shores.
 
=== Location of the pass ===
 
[[File:Map of Battle of Cochin (1504) Pass of Cambalão.gif|330px|thumb|Conjectural map showing several possible positions of the 'Pass of Cambalão' held by the Portuguese in April 1504.
Note: this map is highly conjectural, based roughly on the modern geography of [[Kochi]] and [[Vembanad]] lake, which has probably changed substantially since the 16th century. Green dots = possible locations of the Portuguese position, Straight line = most probable route of Calicut army; Dotted line = alternative longer route for army of Calicut.]]
The exact location of the ''Passe de Cambalão'', the fording point where Duarte Pacheco Pereira made his stand, is uncertain and disputed in various sources. Portuguese ''Cambalão'' is probably modern [[Kumbalam, Ernakulam|Kumbalam]] on the elongated islands in the middle-southern part of the [[Vembanad]] lagoon – that is ''below'' Cochin city. However, some historians (e.g. Logan (1887), Whiteway (1894), Monteiro (1989)) suggest the Portuguese made their stand much further north, at the ford of [[Edapalli]] (Portuguese ''Repelim''), the same pass which Narayan fruitlessly tried to hold the previous year.<ref>Day (1863: p. 92) wants to place the pass at "Chetwye" ([[Chettuva]]), about 40 miles north of Cochin, which is highly improbable. That would place the battle well above Calicut's assembly point at Cranganore.</ref> There are reasons to justify either location and doubt the other.
 
If Kumbalam was indeed the passage, that would suggest the Zamorin's army marched all down the east coast of the lagoon unchallenged. That is not necessarily unlikely. The passage across Kumbalam islands certainly makes a narrow passage for the troops to ford across to the Cochinese peninsula and march calmly up behind Cochin city. The problem is that it also means that the Zamorin's fleet sailed the entire length of the lagoon, from the environs of Cranganore down to Kumbalam – that is, their fleet sailed past Cochin without making a lunge at it or being challenged. And that is unlikely, especially as the Portuguese kept their nau on guard before the city. As a result, the alternative theory, that the Portuguese held their position at Edapalli ford makes more sense.{{Citation needed|date=September 2010}} The name was simply misunderstood – they were blocking the road ''to'' Kumbalam, not ''at'' Kumbalam.
 
But Edapalli pass brings up other inconsistencies – in particular, later in the campaign, the Zamorin sent part of his army to try a different pass to ''Palurte'', which is almost certainly [[Palluruthy]], again ''south'' of Cochin. If they were encamped by Kumbalam, it makes perfect sense – the Zamorin just needed to go back a few steps. But if they were held up at Edapalli ford, that detachment would have had to go across the very pass the Portuguese were holding. If they circumvented it, they would come up below them, which then brings up the question why not attack the Portuguese pass from both sides and finish off the story there? It is possible that ''Palurte'' is misidentified, that it is not Pallurthy, but somewhere else (Logan et al. suggest 'Valanjaca', but where that {{not a typo|is is}} also uncertain.) If the Zamorin was held at Edapalli ford, crossing the lagoon there would have gotten them only to Vypin island, which would not necessarily be a grave concern for the Portuguese, since that would not place them within marching range of Cochin.
 
A third possibility is that Cambalão is actually [[Kumbalangy]] and not Kumbalam – that is the peninsula directly south of Cochin. That means the Calicut army marched much further south, taking a long loop around the southern end of the [[Vembanad]] lagoon through the very southerly 'lands of Porquá'([[Purakkad]]) (or possibly cut across at [[Perumbalam]]) and then marched north through Kumbalangy. The main reasons to contemplate this southern position are: (1) It is practically a continuous land march – if the Zamorin wanted to avoid ferry boats for his huge army, taking the long loop ''under'' the Vembanad lake was the least water-clogged option (2) it places the Portuguese position closer to Cochin – more precisely, the Zamorin would be one ford away from the Cochinese land mass, thus making it a more critical point to hold for the Portuguese; (3) Kumbalangy has [[Aroor]] to the east, which might be what the Portuguese called ''Arraul'' island, with an alternate passage to Cochin that is somewhat pointing through Palluruthy; (4) the southerly loop route to Kumbalangy passes through or near the lands of [[Udayamperoor]] (''Diamper''), [[Perumbalam]] (''Primbalão'') and/or the very southerly lands of [[Purakkad]] (''Porquá''), whose lords were known to have defected from Cochin to Calicut before the battle.<ref>e.g. Correia (p. 482)</ref>
 
The drawbacks to Kumbalangy is the idea of the Calicut fleet sailing there passes even closer to Cochin than before; Aroor does not really point to Palluruthy, and it is difficult visualize where Palignard ford would have been by comparison.
 
(A slight variation has the ford somewhere along what is now the narrow peninsula between Kumbalangy and Kochi – that is, there might have been a tiny strait and ford somewhere there, long since disappeared. That would open the possibility that the Calicut fleet actually did not sail ''into'' the Vembanad lagoon at all, but actually sailed down the outside of it, through the Arabian Sea alone.)
 
=== First assault ===
 
Duarte Pacheco did not have to wait long before the massive army of the Zamorin of Calicut appeared at Kumbalam ford. The army is said to have moved in and deployed their positions on the banks during the night, without anyone quite seeing them until the dawn of March 31 ([[Palm Sunday]]).<ref>Dates vary in the chronicles and histories. Some writers (e.g. Logan, 1887: p.&nbsp;310) date the first assault as early as March 16, the date given by Góis (p.&nbsp;112) for Pacheco setting out for the ford. But that is a mistake, as Góis also says that May 16 was the 'Friday before Palm Sunday' – but [[Palm Sunday]] in 1504 landed on March 31st, not the 18th. We are following the dating in Castanheda (p.&nbsp;196) here, which is also followed by Whiteway (1899:99–100) and others.</ref>
 
The sudden sight, in the early morning light, of the Zamorin's massive army of 84,000 on the banks, already arrayed, in their magnificent arms with flags flying, and guns in position, was a startling sight to the defenders. The intimidating blare of the trumpets and war cries of such a massive army was too much for some of the defenders to bear. The final act in this terrifying prelude was the sudden appearance of the Calicut fleet, 160 armed ships, behind the strait's bend.<ref>Saraiva, (1849: p.&nbsp;133)</ref>
 
Nerves cracked before this display. Some Cochinese boats started sneaking away, others followed, and soon mass panic set in. The Cochinese boats, with their 500 Nairs, were soon all fleeing back to Cochin. Only the three anchored ships, with 90 or so Portuguese (plus two Cochinese officials<ref>The two Cochinese were named ''Frangor'' and ''Candagor'' in Osorio (p.&nbsp;279), to which Góis (p.&nbsp;111) adds they were lords of ''Palurte'' and ''Arraul'' and treasurers (''vedores'') of the Trimumpara Raja. They remained with the Portuguese throughout the encounter.</ref>) remained to face the Zamorin's army and fleet.
 
For Duarte Pacheco, the most immediate worry was the five Venetian guns on the shore. Most of the Indian guns were said to have about the 'range and strength of an arm-thrown stone', which posed little threat to the cotton-reinforced ships. But the Venetian guns could sink them at distance. Pacheco directed all his fire immediately upon those guns, scattering the battery crews, and kept intermittent fire focused on them to prevent them reforming. Fire was also directed at Calicut hatchet-crews which had ventured into the ford to attempt to chop down the ford-blocking [[stockade]].
 
While this was going on, the Calicut fleet began to advance on the Portuguese position. But the very narrowness of the channel chosen by Pacheco had been fortuitous. It did not allow the large Calicut fleet to spread out on a broad front. Instead, they had to approach the anchored Portuguese with a very narrow front. This pitted the three Portuguese ships against only a dozen or so paraus at a time, something the superior Portuguese firepower might handle.
 
The first wave was the most difficult – some 20 boats, tightly tied to each other, advanced together, constituting some 40 bombards and 100 muskets, plus innumerable bowmen. But the tower shields and cotton sacks on the Portuguese ships worked wonders, cushioning the missiles and allowing the Portuguese crossbowmen, musketeers and gunners to pick off the gunners and musketeers on the Malabari boats, which had little or no protection. After a few volleys, four boats were half-sunk, the rest sufficiently damaged or covered in enough dead & wounded to be unable to proceed, and began to retire.
 
They were followed by a second wave of around a dozen boats. But this met much the same fate. Then a third, fourth and fifth, each faring no better. Indeed, it only got easier for the Portuguese, as the sunk, damaged and retiring paraus of earlier waves formed river obstacles (and a demoralizing sight) for the next. By midday, the Calicut fleet commanders realized this was not working, and ordered a retreat.
 
Throughout all this, the Zamorin's army assembled on the shores had been largely ineffective. The tower shields and nets had fended off most of their constant missile fire. Fire had to be occasionally directed to the shore, to ensure the Italian gun batteries remained out of commission and that the hatchet squads did not reach the ford's stockade.
 
It was a humiliating morning for the Zamorin. Chroniclers report that, in this first encounter, the Calicut army and fleet suffered some 1,300 dead, while the Portuguese suffered not a single loss.
 
=== Second assault ===
 
A week elapsed until the second assault on the Kumblam ford, on April 7 ([[Easter Sunday]]).<ref>Logan (1887) dates it at March 25; Whiteway (1899: p.&nbsp;100) says the second assault was on April 5th, (Good Friday). Again we follow Castanheda (p.&nbsp;200) here, who says it was Easter Sunday.</ref> During this interim, the caravel of [[Diogo Pires]] that had been under repair was back in shape and joined the squad at Kumbalam ford. The nau ''Concepção'' remained as sentinel before Cochin city.
 
The Zamorin had also been busy repairing his ships and raising more troops. This time he had decided on a diversionary tactic. While the main Calicut fleet (some 150 boats) headed towards Kumbalam, a fleet of around 70 Calicut paraus would head towards Cochin city itself and engage the nau ''Concepção''. The point was to force Duarte Pacheco's little squad to abandon Kumbalam to rescue Cochin city, thus leaving the Kumbalam ford open for his army to cross.
 
As soon as he heard of this (through usual intelligence channels), the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin immediately dispatched a message to Duarte Pacheco begging him to return. Pacheco shrugged off the request at first. But around 9 AM, with the tide falling and the wind in his favor, Duarte Pacheco decided that the elements might allow him to take up the appeal. Taking one caravel and one batel, and leaving the remaining pair behind to hold the ford, Pacheco raced up towards Cochin. He arrived just as the nau ''Concepção'' was in the process of desperately fending off a heavy assault by the Calicut squad. Seeing Pacheco's two ships coming in from the rear, the Calicut squad realized they were about to be trapped in the crossfire and quickly broke off the engagement and retired.
 
Pacheco did not pause for greetings or inquiries, but immediately turned his boats around and raced back to the Kumbalam pass. The high tide was coming in and the wind was changing. He arrived back at Kumbalam ford just in time to anchor himself in with the others and prepare to meet the bulk of the Calicut fleet, now bearing down on the ford.
 
The same scene was played out as the week before – Calicut paraus forced to advance in small narrow waves, etc. And it was just as fruitless. After losing around 19 ships to heavy damage and some 290 dead, the Calicut admiral called off the attack. The diversionary gambit had failed.
 
=== Third assault ===
 
The next day, rather than resting and recuperating, Duarte Pacheco launched a surprise attack on some small villages on nearby islands, which were said to have furtively supplied paraus to the Calicut fleet. The value of the target itself was not much. Its principal purpose was to unsettle the Zamorin's army psychologically, reminding them that despite all the terrible fighting and casualties of the previous day, the Portuguese were still unscathed and in fresh fighting form.
 
The day after that (Tuesday, April 9), the Zamorin decided on a new tactic. There would be no more impetuous fleet attacks. The fleet was ordered to hold back until Portuguese ships were sunk or severely damaged by shore cannon. To this end, the Calicut batteries carefully positioned and shielded their Venetian cannons.
 
The battle opened with a barrage from land on the Portuguese ships. But while the Venetian guns had the range to hit the ships, the relatively inexperienced battery crews did not have the aim – certainly not from that distance. Duarte Pacheco apprised the situation quickly, and forbade the ships from firing back. His intention was to give the Calicut battery crews confidence and induce them to move their guns forward for better aim (and expose themselves).
 
Pacheco's ruse worked better than he expected. As the guns on the Portuguese ships fell silent, and they just sat there quietly, allowing themselves to be fired upon from land without firing back, the Calicut captains were quick to conclude that the Portuguese must have run out of ammunition. At this point, the Zamorin's cautious plan broke down. Not only did the cannon batteries begin to move out of their shielded positions, the Calicut fleet which had been idling at the mouth of the strait, warily watching the Portuguese, decided this was a golden opportunity. With Portuguese guns out of ammunition, it would be a simple matter for the paraus to rush, grapple, board and overwhelm the Portuguese with their numbers. They impetuously launched themselves downriver towards the Portuguese squad.
 
Duarte Pacheco held fire until the first wave of paraus came close enough, then launched a barrage at point blank range, sinking eight paraus in one massive volley of cannon and musket fire, causing an extraordinary number of casualties. The first wave was broken, but the remainder of the paraus had moved too far forward to pull back now. The very thing the Zamorin had wanted to avoid, was now too late – the fleet was engaging. And it played out as before – small fruitless waves after waves of paraus, broken successively and calmly by Portuguese gunfire. The Venetian gun batteries, now unwisely forward and exposed, were silenced by occasional direct fire on the battery crews.
 
By noon, however, one of the Portuguese ''bateis'' had caught fire, forcing the crew to divide their attentions. The next wave of Calicut paraus concentrated all their efforts on it, hoping to permanently take at least one of the four Portuguese platforms out of commission. But the crew managed to put out the fire, and fend off the attack.
 
By the end of the day, the Calicut fleet retired, having lost 22 paraus and some 600 dead. Despite the exhaustion of the crews, Pacheco ordered his two ''bateis'' to give a brief pursuit on the retreating fleet. A little along the way, the bateis disembarked some soldiers near Edapalli, burned down two small villages, and defeated the guard a local lord had rushed to save them.
 
Despite all this action, the Portuguese, again, suffered not a single death, just a few injured.
 
The Zamorin was demoralized after this assault, and is said to have retired into his tents, in a melancholic mood. Already after the second assault, the Zamorin is said to have realized the pointlessness of repeated attacks on the Kumbalam ford, and had even half-made up his mind to dissolve the campaign and start peace negotiations, rather than subject himself to further humiliations. But he was urged on by his noble captains to give it another try, to restore his honor and keep the faith of his vassals. But now these very same captains, by their impetuosity, had delivered him a third defeat.
 
== Passes of Palignar and Palurte ==
 
The Zamorin was disposed to call off the campaign, if not for the pressure of his commanders, who proposed to abandon Kumbalam and try to reach Cochin via two passages further north – ''Palignar'' and ''Palurte''.
 
=== Location of the passes ===
 
[[File:Map of Battle of Cochin (1504) Passes of Palignar & Palurte.gif|330px|thumb|Conjectural map showing several possible positions of the passes of 'Palignar' and 'Palurte' held by the Portuguese in May–June, 1504. Again highly conjectural. Dark green = one possible hypothesis of position; Light green: another hypothesis of positions. Also shows implied route of redeployment by the army of Calicut from their original position at 'Cambalão'.]]
 
''Palurte'' is almost definitely [[Palluruthy]], south of Cochin. The location of ''Palignar'' (alternatively given as Palinhar, Palinhard, Palignard, Pallinganad, Palimbão) is Panangad an island east of Kumbalam, south of Ernakulam, studded in the Vambanad River. All we know of Palignar is that it is a league or half-league from Palurte (either to the north or south – surprisingly unclear in the chronicles). 'Palignar' (or similar-sounding counterparts) is not easily found in usual geographies of the [[Kerala backwaters]].<ref>'Palinhar' in [[Damião de Góis|Góis]] (p.&nbsp;115), and [[Fernão Lopes de Castanheda|Castanheda]] (p.&nbsp;228); 'Palignar' in [[Jerónimo Osório|Osório]] (p.&nbsp;287), 'Palimbão' in [[Gaspar Correia|Correia]] (p.&nbsp;474), 'Palinhard' in Saraiva (1849: p.&nbsp;138), 'Palignard' in Danvers (1894: p.&nbsp;109), 'Palinganad' in Matthew (1997: p.&nbsp;21); Whiteway (1899: p.&nbsp;100) and Logan (1887: p.&nbsp;310), both of whom placed the 'Kumbalam ford' at Edapalli, identify the alternative pass as 'Valanjaca'.</ref>
 
The chronicles suggest that the passages went via the island of ''Arraul'' (or ''Darraul'' or ''Arrail''). This could be a reference to [[Aroor]], a southerly peninsula, that indeed might be crossed north towards Palluruthy. Of course, this would require us to consider the location of the original 'Cambalão' to be [[Kumbalangy]] (rather than Kumbalam). This is not outlandish – as Aroor is indeed behind Kumbalangy and it does accord with occasional suggestions (e.g. Castanheda, p.&nbsp;228) that the main encampment of the Zamorin's army between these assaults were in the 'lands of Porquá' (probably [[Purakkad]], thus a reference to the southern end of the [[Vembanad]] lagoon).
 
However, picking Aroor as 'Arraul' does not really seem to give us an intuitive idea of where Palignar & Palurte might be relative to each other. Geographies of Kerala backwaters show there are plenty of places with'Aroor'/'Aryoor'- sounding names in the region. And in the documents we have of the Trimumpara's title, he cites his lordship of Arraul as third in importance (after Cochin and Vypin), suggesting it should not be obscure or a great distance away.<ref>e.g. Doc. 8 in Duarte Pacheco Pereira (1509: p.xix)</ref> Moreover, there are suggestions (e.g. Castanheda, pp.&nbsp;224, 227) that the fighting was very close to Cochin city and Fort Manuel. Finally, some of the chronicles suggest that the route via Arraul was a rather direct passage to Cochin city – indeed, the very passage taken by the Zamorin's armies in the first siege of 1503.<ref>Góis (p.&nbsp;115); Saraiva (1849: p.&nbsp;138)</ref>
 
As a result, one probable hypothesis is that ''Arraul'' island might be modern [[Willingdon Island]] in Kochi harbor (or rather underlying island located there previously, as most of Willingdon was artificially created in the 1920s). Thus 'Palignar' and 'Palurte' were passes through it that entered directly onto the landmass where Cochin city sits.
 
However, all this is speculative conjecture. There is no agreement among chronicles, scholars or historians on any of these locations.
 
=== Redeployment to Arraul ===
 
Chroniclers claim that Palignar(Panangad)-Palurte (Palluruthi) crossings via Arraul(Aroor) island were available and unprotected during the Kumbalam ford attacks, but that the Zamorin never attempted them because the Kumbalam destination, once fixed, "became a point of honor" to adhere to. Moreover, the northerly passages were covered by dense forests and thickets unsuitable for the easy passage of his large army.<ref>Gois, ibid.</ref> But the biggest drawback is that they were not easily passed – that is, Palignar was only [[Ford (crossing)|fordable]] on foot at low tide, whereas Palurte required ferry boats. But such considerations were now set aside. The principal advantage of the Arraul passages is that they were two – that is, that the Portuguese would not be able to defend both Palignar and Palurte simultaneously.
 
In late April, the Zamorin lifted his camp at Kumbalam and began to withdraw – seemingly back to Calicut. But Duarte Pacheco Pereira soon received notice that Zamorin's army was in fact heading to the Palignar-Palurte passes, and that advanced troops of the Zamorin, some 500 Nairs, were already on Arraul island, cutting down thickets to ease the passage of the army. Pacheco rushed with a couple of boats up to Arraul, while the Trimumpara Raja dispatched an army of some 200 Cochinese [[Nairs]] from Cochin city to join him there.<ref>Osorio, p.&nbsp;288</ref> Pacheco took command of them, divided them into two columns, one under himself another under Pêro Rafael, and drove the thicket-cutters back.<ref>Góis (p.&nbsp;115)</ref>
 
Duarte Pacheco set about organizing his position before the arrival of the rest of the Calicut army, estimated to be but a mere one day way. His caravels could only go as far as Palurte ferry – lack of water depth prevented the caravels from advancing beyond that. So Pacheco ordered the two caravels (under [[Pêro Rafael]] and [[Diogo Pires]]) to anchor in at Palurte with iron cords, while he proceeded with the two smaller bateis on to Palignar ford.
 
At Palignar, Duarte Pacheco anchored both his ''bateis'' on the bank, placing them under the command [[Simão de Andrade]] and [[Cristóvão Jusarte]]<ref>Góis (p.&nbsp;116)</ref> [Note: Correa (p.&nbsp;402) calls the latter "Jusarte Pacheco" or "Lisuarte Pacheco", and identifies him as the son of Duarte Pacheco]. The near bank of the ford was to be held by a 600-strong force of Cochinese Nairs dispatched by the Trimumpara Raja, under the command of his nephew and heir, Unni Goda Varda (''Candagora''<ref>e.g. Osório, p.&nbsp;293</ref>). The factor's assistant, [[Lourenço Moreno]], apparently bored of Fort Manuel and wanting some action, showed up at the ford and was assigned to either take command of a land entrenchment or aboard some Cochinese canoes. But perhaps the most critical step, Duarte Pacheco ordered the troops and crews to clear the opposite banks of vegetation, so as to deprive enemy archers and cannons any form of protective cover.<ref>Osorio, p.&nbsp;289; Góis, p.&nbsp;116</ref>
 
The critical key to Duarte Pacheco's defense was the [[tide]]s. Although forced to defend two passages, he realized he did not have to defend them both at once. Palignar ford could only be crossed on foot at low tide, during which time the water at Palurte is too shallow for the Zamorin's ships and ferry boats to move. At high tide, boats could move at Palurte, but the infantry could not ford at Palignar. So Duarte Pacheco calculated he could shuttle himself and some of his forces back and forth via shallow [[Launch (boat)|launches]] between the two passes – reinforcing the Nairs and bateis at Palignar in low tide, and then slip down the strait to help the caravels at Palurte at high tide.
 
=== Fourth assault ===
 
The vanguard of the Zamorin's army, some 15,000 infantry led by Prince Naubeadarim, arrived at Palignar ford a day or two after the skirmish at Arraul. Around the same time, the Calicut fleet, some 250 vessels under lord Ercanol of Edapalli, reached the environs of Palurte. Naubeadrim set himself to seize control of the ford with his army, leaving Ercanol to dislodge the two caravels at Palurte.
 
The attack began at dawn of May 1.<ref>Again, date given by Castanheda (p.&nbsp;208).</ref> As the tide was high during the morning, Palignar was impassable to Naubeadarim's infantry, so Pacheco left the ''bateis'' with only a small crew under the command of Andrade and Jusarte, and rushed most of his forces on longboats down to Palurte. A contingent of Cochinese Nairs accompanied Pacheco, although the bulk stayed with prince Candagora at the near side of the Palignar ford.
 
The clearing of the vegetation on the opposite banks immediately paid off as, upon reaching Palurte, Pacheco easily noticed a number of Calicut cannons being rolled into position, aiming to sink the anchored caravels. Duarte Pacheco ordered concentrated fire from the ships on their position, scattering the Calicut artillery crews. He then landed a Portuguese-Cochinese assault force on the beach, who rushed up to finish off the lingering Calicut crews and dragged away or spiked the abandoned Calicut cannons.
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